Duits krantenartikel leidt tot artikel 10 EVRM geschil

EHRM 17 januari 2023, IEF 21342; 8964/18 (Axel Springer SE tegen Duitsland) Axel Springer SE, een Berlijnse uitgeverij, publiceerde in 2013 een artikel in haar krant Die Welt, waarin werd beweerd dat mevrouw K., uitvoerend directeur van politieke partij ‘Die Linke’, een voormalig geheim agent was voor de voormalige Duitse Democratische Republiek (DDR). Daarnaast beschreef het krantenartikel dat mevrouw K. te maken zou hebben met de verdwijning van enorme activa van de voormalige communistische partij van Oost-Duitsland na de val van het regime in 1989. Mevrouw K. eist een rectificatie in Die Welt na plaatsing van het artikel. Nadat de uitgeverij weigert een rectificatie te publiceren, stapt mevrouw K. naar het  Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens. De vraag die centraal stond was of de verplichting van Die Welt tot het publiceren van een rectificatie op verzoek van mevrouw K., een schending oplevert van artikel 10 EVRM: de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Het Hof oordeelt dat mevrouw K. een legitiem belang had bij de rectificatie en dat er daarom geen sprake is van een schending van artikel 10 EVRM.

(a)  General principles

32.  An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” (see, for example, Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 81024/12 and 28198/15, § 98, 25 June 2020, and M.P. v. Finland, no. 36487/12, § 51, 15 December 2016).

33.  The press plays an essential role in a democratic society. In determining whether, in the present case, the interference with the applicant company’s rights was “necessary in a democratic society” the Court thus observes at the outset that as a general principle, newspapers and other privately-owned media must be free to exercise editorial discretion in deciding whether to publish articles, comments and letters submitted by private individuals. The Court has held that the legal obligation to publish a rectification may be considered a normal element of the legal framework governing the exercised of the freedom of expression by the media (see Kaperzyński v. Poland, no. 43206/07, § 66, 3 April 2012; Rusu v. Romania, no. 25721/04, § 25, 8 March 2016; Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, §§ 50 and 54, 28 March 2017). At the same time, it has stressed that given the high level of protection enjoyed by the press there need to be exceptional circumstances in which a newspaper may legitimately be required to publish, for example, a retraction, an apology or a judgment in a defamation case (see Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, ECHR 2005-IX, and Eker v. Turkey, no. 24016/05, § 45, 24 October 2017). In this respect the potential chilling effect of the penalties imposed on the press in the performance of its task as a purveyor of information and public watchdog in the future must also be taken into consideration (see, mutatis mutandis, Radio Twist a.s. v. Slovakia, no. 62202/00, § 53, ECHR 2006-XV, in respect of interference with the right to impart information).

(b)  Application of these principles to the present case

38.  In examining the “necessity” of the interference in the light of the above-mentioned principles and considerations, regard needs to be given to the object, content, length and timing of the rectification. For this purpose, the following aspects, inter alia, should be taken into account (see also paragraph 35 above): the existence of a legitimate interest in a rectification owing to the content and dissemination of the impugned statement; whether a sufficient connection exists between the rectification and the impugned statement and the proportionality of the rectification in respect of its content and length, the placing of the rectification and any delay between the publication of the article and the lodging of the request for a rectification.

49.  In the light of the aforementioned considerations, the Court finds that, in assessing the circumstances submitted for its appreciation, the Court of Appeal gave due consideration to the principles and criteria, as laid down by the Court’s case-law for balancing the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression. The Court discerns no strong reasons that would require it to substitute its view for that of the Court of Appeal (see the case-law quoted in paragraph 37 above).

50.  Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.