UK High Court: ISPs moeten toegang streaming websites blokkeren
Auteursrecht. 18 point summary of case law on communication to the public. Linking and communication to the public very much depends on the circumstances.
The Solarmovie/Tube+ websites are so called streaming sites. They offer their audience a collection of movies and TV programs via links to filehosting platforms (cyberlockers). Following a thorough analysis of the recent CJEU caselaw, UK caselaw and academic opinion (ALAI, ECS) the court finds that the websites directly infringe copyright under the communication to the public right (Art 3 InfoSoc). The court orders the ISPs to block access to the websites.
Justice Arnold starts his analysis with a very helpful 18-point summary of the recent CJEU caselaw on the communication to the public right (pasted below) and the pending CJEU referrals in Svensson, C-More, Bestwater (YouTube). Regarding academic opinion, Arnold mentions the European Copyright Society paper (that linking can never amount to a communication) and the 2013 ALAI report (that, under circumstances, linking can amount to a communication). Arnold questions the relevance of the EU Copyright Society's position by noting that this study predates the CJEU TV-Catchup verdict. On the basis that verdicts in the pending CJEU referrals are not imminent Arnold then adjudicates the linking issue on the basis of current UK caselaw (FAPL v. Sky, Fox v. Newzbin, EMI v. Sky) in the following key paragraph:
As the law presently stands, I adhere to the view that the actions of operators of websites like the one under consideration in FAPL v Sky amount to communication to the public of works within Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive, and more specifically to making those works available to the public in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. I acknowledge that it is arguable that the mere provision of a hyperlink is not enough to constitute communication to the public (particularly if the hyperlink is not directly to a source of the copyright work). I also acknowledge that it is arguable that it makes no difference whether or not the source of the copyright work to which the hyperlink links is licensed by the copyright owner. I also acknowledge that it is arguable that it makes no difference whether clicking on the links results in framing (i.e. the work being presented within the frame of the operator’s website) or not. What the operators of FirstRow were doing, however, went beyond the mere provision of hyperlinks linking (directly) to (unlicensed) sources of copyright works (which were framed). As explained in the passage quoted above, they were intervening in a highly material way to make the copyright works available to a new audience.
I turn, therefore, to consider whether there is a material difference between FirstRow and the Websites in this respect. In my judgment, there is no material difference, and the operators of the Websites communicate the Claimants’ works to the public. Indeed, the evidence in the present case makes it clear that it would be very difficult for members of the public to access much of the content directly from the host sites if it were not made available by the Websites. Even where the content could be accessed from the host sites, the Websites make it much easier for members of the public to find what they want. Viewed from the perspective of the user, the Websites do in a very real sense make the content available to the public.
In summary, Arnold holds that the question of linking and communication to the public very much depends on the circumstances of each case. It all depends on the extent of the intervention by the website. Arnold avoids taking a technology specific approach, i.e. does not follow the transmission argument nor the distinction between deeplinks and referring links. This is a workable approach allowing for copyright to be applied against structurally infringing websites whilst the internet itself will not be affected. In short, another step forward towards an internet that works for everyone!
Arnold’s 18-point summary of the CJEU caselaw on communication to the public is as follows:
(1) “Communication to the public” must be interpreted broadly: SGAE at [36], [54], FAPL at [186], ITV at [20].
(2) “Communication to the public” covers any transmission or retransmission of the work to the public not present at the place where the communication originates by wire or wireless means: ITV at [23].
(3) “Communication to the public” does not include any communication of a work which is carried out directly in a place open to the public by means of public performance or direct presentation of the work: Circul at [36]-[41], FAPL at [200]-[203].
(4) There is no “communication to the public” where the viewers have no access to an essential element which characterises the work: Bezpečností at [57].
(5) “Communication” includes any retransmission of the work by a specific technical means different from that of the original communication: ITV at [24]-[26].
(6) A mere technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original transmission in its catchment area does not constitute a “communication”: SGAE at [42], FAPL at [194], Airfield at [74], ITV at [28].
(7) There is an act of “communication” when someone gives members of the public access to the work in circumstances where they would not be able to enjoy the work without that intervention: SGAE at [42], FAPL at [194]-[196], Airfield at [72], SCF at [82], PPIL at [31].
(8) It is sufficient for there to be “communication” that the work is made available to the public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it whether or not those persons actually access the work: SGAE at [43].
(9) Mere provision of physical facilities does not as such amount to “communication”: SGAE at [46].
(10) Nevertheless, the installation of physical facilities which distribute a signal and thus make public access to works technically possible constitutes “communication”: SGAE at [46]-[47], Organismos at [39]-[41].
(11) “The public” refers to an indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies a fairly large number of persons: SGAE at [37]-[38], SCF at [84], PPIL at [33], ITV at [32].
(12) For that purpose, the cumulative effect of making the works available to potential recipients should be taken into account, and it is particularly relevant to ascertain the number of persons who have access to the same work at the same time and successively: SGAE at [39], SCF at [87], PPIL at [35], ITV at [33].
(13) In considering whether there is a communication to “the public”, it is not irrelevant that the communication is of a profit-making nature: SGAE at [44], FAPL at [204]-[206], Airfield at [80], SCF at [88]-[90], PPIL at [36].
(14) There is no communication to “the public” where sound recordings are broadcast by way of background music to patients of a private dental practice: SCF at [92]-[102].
(15) Where there is a communication which does not use a different technical means to that of the original communication, it is necessary to show that the communication is to a new public, that is to say, a public which was not considered by the authors concerned when they authorised the original communication: SGAE at [40], Organismos at [38], FAPL at [197], Airfield at [72], [76], ITV at [38].
(16) There is a communication to a new public where television broadcasts are transmitted to an additional public (that is to say, additional to the public constituted by owners of television sets who receive broadcasts within their own private and family circle) such as customers of hotels and public houses: SGAE at [41], Organismos at [37], FAPL at [198]-[199].
(17) There is also a communication to a new public where a satellite package provider expands the circle of persons having access to the relevant works: Airfield at [77]-[82].
(18) Where there is a communication using a different technical means to that of the original communication, it is not necessary to consider whether the communication is to a new public: ITV at [39].