28 jun 2017
Uitspraak ingezonden door Tobias Cohen Jehoram en Astrid Janssen, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek.
Normaal gebruik van Spaans woordmerk NN onvoldoende bewezen
Gerecht EU 28 juni 2017, IEF 16908; IEFbe 2230; ECLI:EU:T:2017:444; T-333/15 (Josel tegen EUIPO) Woordmerk. Nationale Nederlanden (NN) heeft een internationaal woordmerk voor het woord NN. Josel heeft oppositie ingesteld vanwege zijn eerdere geregistreerde Spaanse woordmerk NN. Het merk is vernietigd door de Spaanse rechter. De oppositieafdeling verwierp de oppositie op grond dat het bewijs van het gebruik van het eerdere teken niet was verstrekt. De inschrijving heeft betrekking op een woordmerk, maar het bewijs toont dat sprake is van een beeldmerk. Verder wordt gesteld dat geen sprake is van normaal gebruik in de vorm waarvoor het is ingeschreven. Het Gerecht EU bevestigt dat normaal gebruik van het merk onvoldoende is bewezen.
43. In this context, first, it must be noted that, admittedly, the word mark ‘núñez i navarro’ is always placed below the circle containing the letters ‘nn’. However, in the majority of the pieces of evidence presented it occupies a central position, especially when either the word element ‘hotels’ or the reference to an address is placed below it.
44. Second, the word element ‘núñez i navarro’, in terms of width, occupies a much more significant space than that of the word mark ‘nn’, having regard to the number of characters each contains.
45. Lastly, with regard to the fact that the surnames ‘núñez’ and ‘navarro’ appear in the marks used, the letters ‘nn’ are very likely to be perceived as constituting the initials of those surnames. Furthermore, it must be noted that, as surnames, the words ‘núñez’ and ‘navarro’ are not generic terms referring to the services in question and therefore have normal distinctive character when they are used to describe those services.
46. In the circumstances, it is necessary to approve the Board of Appeal’s conclusion that the addition of the word element ‘núñez i navarro’ to the earlier mark changes its distinctive character.
47. Accordingly, without needing to rule on the impact of the other modifications and additions in the evidence presented as mentioned in paragraph 35 above, the Court rejects, as unfounded, the single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 15(1)(a) and Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation No 207/2009.
The arguments alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/200948. It must be noted that, although the applicant recognises that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal ruled solely on the alleged lack of proof of use of the earlier mark and, as a result, the current action concerns only this question, it nevertheless proceeds to an analysis of likelihood of confusion and submits that there is such a likelihood in the present case.
49. Clearly these arguments are ineffective. Indeed, since the question of proof of use of the earlier mark constitutes a preliminary question as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 and, as discussed in paragraph 47 above, the Board of Appeal correctly held that there was no proof of genuine use of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal had no need to rule on the question of whether there was any likelihood of confusion.
50. It follows from all the foregoing that the application must be dismissed in its entirety.